

CHAPTER 2

Negotiation Models for Crisis Situations

Michel St-Yves and Jean-Pierre Veyrat

*Knowing how to listen is an art.
Knowing how to negotiate is mastering that art.*

Guy Cabana

Hostage-takings have historically been resolved by the use of force (Bahn, 2003). This type of intervention brings a quick end to the crisis (action-reaction), but it also leads to high numbers of dead and injured among the hostage-takers, hostages and police. This is one of the main reasons for the change in philosophy underlying police interventions in crisis situations.

Most negotiation models have been developed to facilitate business negotiations. A business negotiation is a confrontation of divergent interests between an offer and a demand that each side attempts to make compatible, through a game of mutual concessions, until a satisfactory agreement is reached. Business negotiation models have proven their utility in all kinds of interventions with rational individuals who seek gains in contexts involving political or ransom demands, or in hostage-takings by criminals caught in the act of committing other crimes. The role of negotiators in such cases is to focus on the content of the demands, the “substance” of the problem (hostages, deadlines, conditions), and they draw heavily on business practices. These so-called traditional models are however of little use when it comes to dealing with mentally disturbed individuals. The vast majority of crisis interventions nevertheless involve such individuals and the strategies for achieving a peaceful surrender in such

cases are essentially based on crisis intervention. The focus then shifts to psychological aspects, and the intervention is based on listening, empathy and communication, but once again using a significant number of the fundamental methods of any type of negotiation.

In this chapter we will examine the different models that have been developed to facilitate police interventions in crisis situations involving both rational and mentally disturbed individuals. These models have been mostly developed based on field experience and they are neither perfect nor infallible. The best model is probably one that is the sum of all those presented in this chapter and improved by future discoveries in the field. Models must be flexible, especially for responders, and evolve as new knowledge is acquired and progress is made. Models must also be relatively simple, to facilitate teaching, assist understanding of the dynamic process of crisis intervention, and provide structures that less experienced responders can follow. A model is a means of standardizing practice; it provides a language—or jargon—and a single intervention philosophy focused on resolving crises through dialogue.

A) THEORIES AND MODELS OF BUSINESS NEGOTIATION

Crisis negotiation is a dual concept: on the one hand there is the negotiation, with its principles and techniques, and on the other, the crisis with its particular context and parameters. This fact immediately highlights the fundamental difference between traditional negotiation and crisis negotiation, as well as the more complex difference between the psychological and rational aspects of crisis negotiations.

To negotiate is to rationally assess a dispute and seek the best solution. There are three basic principles of negotiation:

1. We choose to negotiate because we are faced with a problem set by someone whose contribution will enable us to achieve a viable outcome. This differs from resorting to force, where the will to eliminate the other predominates, or legal recourse, where a third party is needed to decide between right and wrong.

2. Two conditions are needed in order for a negotiation to take place:
 - a) Acceptance by both parties that they are in conflict; and
 - b) The will to reach a common solution.
3. A negotiation may be led from either a rational viewpoint or a psychological one, depending on the techniques associated with each one, as summarized in the following definitions:

On the rational level, a negotiation is the settling of opposing interests through the combined action of strategies, techniques and tactics whose goal is to reach a compromise in which compensations tend to counterbalance concessions.

On the psychological level, a negotiation is a bringing together of divergent positions, by means of a succession of verbal and behavioural exchanges, that continues until an agreement is reached (Veyrat, 2009: 29-30).

The Specific Nature of Business Negotiations

There are two major criteria that distinguish business negotiations:

1. The first is the material interdependence of the two parties. One party has something that the second one wants, while the second one has a compensation that the first one wants in return.
2. The second is the price of everything. The resolution of disputes involves rewards and costs for each party (Folger, Poole & Stutman, 1993). The disputes can only be resolved by respecting the condition that one must give in order to receive. In other words, each of the parties holds one half of a ticket that only has value if it is joined to the half held by the other. This is what Boardman and Horowitz (1994) call constructive conflict management.

B) TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATION MODELS

“What’s the difference between a buyer for a big box store and a hostage-taker?”

– You can negotiate with a hostage-taker.”

This joke, which is told in France, highlights the difficult nature of crisis negotiations, in which the equivocal nature of negotiation—is it an exchange in which the willingness to participate in dialogue predominates, or one in which the objective is not to make the other side hear reason, but to gain concessions?—reaches its climax. The outstretched hand of friendship engages in a trial of strength, and the symbol of the attentive ear is replaced by that of a game of ear tug-of-war played with an elastic band.

The crisis negotiator is assigned precisely this difficult mission of giving a little to receive the maximum from individuals who use human beings as bargaining chips and seek top price. In the minds of these individuals, the hostages are tokens to be haggled over. Here, knowledge of business negotiation assists in understanding the dual nature of negotiation: the humanistic view in which listening and dialogue predominate, and the materialistic view, where respect for the positions of each side is gained through shows of force.

So-called “rational” individuals carry out their actions with specific goals and motives that justify their behaviour. When hostages are present, they are used to make substantial demands (involving money, escape or exchanges). Hostage-takers have no interest in wounding hostages who are valuable bargaining chips. In interventions, the FBI recommends visible deployment of the tactical intervention group, gaining time (this can reduce the subject’s expectations [Klein, 2003]), showing the advantages of surrender over resistance, using negotiation techniques (persuasion and influence techniques), and allowing the hostage-taker or takers to surrender to the police without “losing face.”

Negotiation is practiced in the business world more than anywhere else, so theories and models of business negotiation abound. We have therefore chosen to consider a few of these models, ones that can be directly applied to “hostage-trading” situations in which police negotiators may be involved.

1. The “Win-Win” Model

The win-win model, known as “principled negotiation,” constitutes the theoretical (and historical) basis of business negotiations. Formally set out in the late 1970s by Roger Fisher and William Ury, the founders of the Harvard Negotiation Project, this model seeks to achieve a satisfactory and lasting agreement between persons who have both divergent and common interests.

Principled negotiation is based on four principles:

1. The first principle is to separate the dispute from the people involved and ensure that each person benefits. Indeed, assuming the principle that in negotiations the dispute (the rational part) and the people (the psychological part) are closely intertwined, Fisher and Ury (1981) consider that the emotional aspect often gets the upper hand, to the point that it is detrimental to efforts to get to the heart of the matter.
2. The second principle is to focus on the interests at hand, not on positions. By looking beyond positions and exploring interests, the parties discover that in addition to divergent interests, they also have common ones. Application of this principle, the cornerstone of principled negotiation, is key to finding a winning solution in a crisis situation. A good illustration of this statement is two people fighting over an orange to get a bigger piece, until they realize that one only wants the pulp to get the juice, while the other just wants the peel to make candied orange peel.
3. The third principle is to imagine options that will lead to mutual gain. Before making any commitment, it is important to consider the widest range of scenarios that are likely to lead to a mutually satisfactory solution. At this stage in the process, imaginatively exploring options until an alternative solution is found must take precedence over the desire to reach a decision. Otherwise there will be an impasse if the opposing party is too powerful.
4. The fourth and last principle is to require the use of objective criteria to eliminate differing influences or interpretations and ensure a final decision that is essentially just and equitable.

2. The Lax and Sebenius Model

In their 1995 work *Les gestionnaires et la négociation* [French translation of *The Manager as Negotiator: Bargaining for Cooperation and Competitive Gain*, 1987], David Lax and James Sebenius posit that negotiation is a complex process based on a fundamental tension between cooperative and competitive tactics. This is explained by the coexistence of two opposing views of negotiation.

1. Cooperative tactics seek mutual gain by creating value. Negotiators who position themselves to create value are adept at non-zero sum game negotiations in which the two sides join together to either lose all or win all, but they do so together. The objective here is common victory (or common defeat), not victory for one sanctioned by automatic defeat of the other. This type of exchange is one of the best ways to increase the share of benefits for each party by means of creative solutions. Through a play of reciprocal concessions, both parties can potentially receive benefits that neither would have obtained individually.
2. Competitive tactics are value claims whose purpose is to seek maximum gain to the detriment of the other party. Negotiators who position themselves to claim value view negotiations as a “zero-sum game,” where the appropriation of a gain on one side means an equivalent reduction for the other: there is inevitably one winner and one loser. For Lax and Sebenius (1995), negotiation is characterized by a permanent tension between these two types of tactics that constitutes the “negotiator’s dilemma.”

Thus the likelihood of achieving a fair transaction rests on the parties’ common desire to agree on a single strategy, as demonstrated by the negotiator’s dilemma. The two authors developed this principle based on Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood’s 1950 model of the prisoner’s dilemma, which was given a more general application by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa in their 1957 work *Games and Decisions*. It can be summarized as follows:

Two negotiators named A and B are given four choices to resolve or reduce their dispute (see Figure 1):

- A and B both decide to claim; the end result for both will be mediocre;
- A offers to create value, while B decides to claim value; in this case A will achieve a terrible result, and B will achieve a great result.
- A chooses to claim value, while B offers to create value; A will get a great result and B will get a terrible result.
- A and B choose to create value together; they will both achieve a good result.

If both remain focused on meeting their initial demands, it is most likely that the result will be mediocre. If they decide instead to work together on alternative solutions, it is more likely that they will achieve a better result. However, a party that promises gain to an opposing party that immediately claims its due will see its attempt end in failure.

Figure 1

		Negociator B	
		Claim	Create
Negociator A	Claim	Mediocre Mediocre	Terrible Great
	Create	Great Terrible	Good Good

Applied to hostage-trading situations, this rational aspect of the tension between cooperation and appropriation is highly significant. As William Zartman explains: “[Terrorists] need to be shown that there is no chance of their original demands being met but that their future personal situation is open for discussion; innumerable details then become available for negotiation.” (*PIN points*, 25/2005: 4). The negotiator’s dilemma of finding a rational solution to a crisis situation is thus to engage in a battle of wills and haggle over demands, or

invite the hostage-takers to join in a common search for an honourable exit. In both cases a positive outcome is possible. Above all, however, it is essential to keep in mind that as long as abductors remain entrenched in their initial positions, it is futile to create openings. There is a risk that tension will rise high enough to endanger the hostages' lives.

3. The TINA Model

TINA is a negotiation model for conflict situations created in 1990 (Veyrat, 2009). It derives its name from a nickname for Margaret Thatcher, who would often reply "*There Is No Alternative!*" to those who refused her political positions. Initially devised for business purposes, it was subsequently applied to kidnappings and hostage-takings by rational abductors with the emergence in France, and elsewhere in Europe and the rest of the world, of negotiations involving so-called "hostage-trading." The 1994 Marignane Airbus hijacking and a series of events including political abductions and the Jolo crisis are notable examples of such cases.

The letters of the TINA acronym stand for the four succeeding stages of negotiation that the model defines:

- T is for the TENSION that develops between the two parties;
- I is for the IDENTIFICATION of the existing areas of tension and key players;
- N is for the NEUTRALIZATION of these areas of tension and key players;
- A is for the movement towards an AGREEMENT.

The negotiator is guided through the stages by specific objectives for each one. The first two stages deal with the way the dispute manifests itself and how the adversary's intentions are measured. How does the adversary feel about the opposing forces, and what must the adversary know in order to act? The last two stages cover the response scenarios to be prepared and the tactics for the final face-to-face negotiations: what can be conceded, what will be rejected, and how to go about it.

TINA is a method of training, a method of conduct, and a method for assessing the contexts and parameters within which negotiators must work. It functions as a template for the rational progression of conflict negotiations, setting flexible stages that can be returned to as required depending on the subject's level of tension.

The TINA model helps in understanding conflict negotiations with regard to three points in particular: the offensive position, the free or captive nature of the context, and the logic of honour versus the logic of the contract.

a) The Offensive Position

The TINA model integrates the tension that inevitably plays a role in conflicts of interest, demonstrating that highly competitive negotiations periodically set two extremes into opposition:

- a) Negotiators entrenched in an offensive position, creating a dispute over something that they hope will lead to considerable gain in the event of success.
- b) Negotiators in a defensive position—perfectly aware that their adversaries in the offensive position cannot be satisfied without their consent—who seek to take advantage of this fact to strengthen their position and obtain further benefits.

Their confrontation will be a collision of “tension with tension” between the offensive negotiator on one side, who will work to create a tension of attack, and the defensive negotiator on the other, who will create a tension of resistance. Offensive negotiators will set off a dispute in the form of a demand that is out of proportion, a crushing blow intended to obtain as many concessions as possible from their adversary. Think of the football player who sets the bar for joining a team at \$45 million. At this stage the player in no way appears as a negotiator, and seems rather like a hostage-taker hostile to discussion and prepared to use force to get his way. It is only afterward that he will make any concession on the main issue and feign a conciliatory attitude. He will change into a “reasonable” person ready to back down on certain initial demands. In the event of victory, the compromise obtained by the offensive negotiator will however constitute a tremendous advance over the original situation. He will have created

a shift in the situation, which may appear ludicrous and which no-one beside him would have believed in. This offensive position is systematically attempted by kidnappers. Only “novice” kidnappers make reasonable requests.

b) Free and Captive Contexts

Negotiators may take part in two types of negotiations: so-called “free” negotiations and so-called “captive” ones. Generally speaking, a free negotiation is one in which the two parties decide voluntarily to move closer together to find a solution and retain their freedom to back out at any time. This is the most widespread type of negotiation. The relationship between the parties is therefore freely agreed upon, the desired result is a shared objective, and the bargaining is led with the willingness to close a good deal. The positions of both parties are declared out of concern to prevent a breakdown, and the dependency of their relationship is limited to the anticipated gain. Captive negotiation, on the other hand, is a bargaining mode in which there is no voluntary aspect. The parties are prisoners of the same problem, and they cannot back out unless they want to lose everything. The situation leaves them no other reasonable way out aside from meeting.

Captive negotiation has important implications:

- The negotiations are dictated by the same requirement for a result by the two parties;
- The tension is systematically maintained to force adversaries to back down on their positions;
- The interdependency between the parties is very strong and often unbalanced, favouring one over the other; and
- Because of the captive nature of the relationship, conflictual tactics are widely used without fear of a breakdown.

In personal relationships, the captive phenomenon can be found in difficult and often painful divorce negotiations in which neither of the spouses can avoid seeking consensus on the divided custody and education of children, even if their relationship is miserable. When applied to crisis situations, this distinction sheds new light on how to conduct negotiations involving kidnappings and barricaded hos-

tage-takings. Indeed, negotiations with a kidnapper whose whereabouts are unknown and who may cut off contact at any time are not subject to the same rules as negotiations with a person in an entrenched position and under control. The pressure tactics, room for manoeuvre and restrictions are of a different order. In cases of hostage-takings or kidnappings with victims in unknown locations, inaccessibility gives kidnappers the upper hand. The time factor is also clearly on their side, and they can choose a new interlocutor whenever they wish. In a hostage-taking in a barricaded space, the bargaining conditions are of a radically different nature. The hostage-takers are highly vulnerable, as much prisoners as their victims, time is against them physically, and the hostages provide their sole room for manoeuvre. The negotiators, on the other hand, hold the main advantage, being acknowledged by the kidnappers as their required contact: "I can't do without you, and you can't do without me." Nevertheless, the negotiators must still function under a state of constant emergency in both the negotiations and the quest for the compensations needed for their exchanges. They systematically maintain the tension to require their adversaries to keep pace.

c) *The Logic of Honour Versus the Logic of the Contract*

Each social group has a "specific way of connecting the individual to the group, separating good from evil and what is legitimate from what is illegitimate, what is respected, what leaves one indifferent, and what is scorned."¹ [Translation]

A relatively high number of conflicts of interest have in common the fact that they require negotiators to deal with very different views of concession and compensation. Some are firmly rooted in the logic of honour while others are entrenched in the logic of the contract. The logic of honour is based on very strong values: trust, respect of commitments, and assuming moral responsibility for one's decisions, even in the absence of obligation. Negotiators who obey this logic do not seek results at any cost; they may bow to fair play and assign great importance to symbolic concessions involving principles, rank and status. In their view, failure to respect one's word, making one's opponent lose face, or do something in violation of their principles or honour, are unspeakable misdeeds. The logic of the contract opposes the logic of honour. For those imbued with the logic of the contract, anything goes in the defence of one's interests, so long as the

1. Philippe d'Iribarne, *La logique de l'honneur*, Éditions du Seuil.

law, but only the law, is respected. The context is business, and the contract and the flexibility it offers (bid, acceptance and renunciation) are the fixed framework for their reasoning, which allows no room for informal manoeuvres. To seize the desired compensation from their adversaries, negotiators who obey contract logic will not hesitate to use uncompromising methods, setting aside scruples in the process. Survival of the fittest is the prevailing logic—"it's either him or me"—like a fox in the henhouse, and too bad for the weak, or those who think they can sway their opponents by appealing to their morals or obliging them to give anything more than what has been agreed upon. The collision of these two mindsets is particularly severe when they occur in a confrontation, especially in crisis negotiations, where misunderstanding the rules by which the adversary functions may not only lead the sides to speak at cross purposes, but cause a clear and definitive breakdown that no personal ties will be able to repair

The value of TINA lies in how it accounts for the rational side of crisis negotiations in its principal stages of implementation. However, their implementation remains complex insofar as it presupposes the integration of parameters that vary widely from case to case.

C) THEORIES AND MODELS OF CRISIS INTERVENTION

In the early 1970s, Dr. Harvey Schlossberg and his colleagues at the New York Police Department (NYPD) professionalized crisis intervention practices. In particular this meant favouring negotiation as a peaceful means of intervention. Using negotiation to resolve crisis situations is not only less risky (less than 1% of those involved are injured or killed: see Leviton & Greenstone, 2002), it is also more humane and effective.

Crisis negotiation respects the same basic rules as ordinary negotiation, but it differs from traditional models in several respects. In particular, negotiators must consider whether the individuals they are dealing with are classified as mentally disturbed or if they are rational and determined. Thus there are two possible orientations, which depend on who the negotiators must deal with, as the nature and content of demands are at opposite ends of the spectrum: from impulsiveness at one end to preparation at the other. Cases in the first group are classified using expressions such as neutralization

of armed and dangerous individuals, and here the focus is on the psychological aspects. Cases in the second group are persons who, while certainly in a temporary state of limited rationality, since they can be mentally disturbed by the crisis situation, are perfectly aware of how to sustain a show of force. If a subject is mentally disturbed, even if only temporarily, and does not have or no longer has the rationality needed to be receptive to traditional negotiation models, the intervention methods must be adapted.

Mentally disturbed individuals often display self-destructive behaviour motivated by anger, frustration or depression. Their demands are generally neither realistic nor specific, unless it is to demand that police leave the premises (Michaud, St-Yves & Guay, 2008). If there are “hostages” they attack them (since they do not really consider them as hostages) with the intention of injuring or killing them. In circumstances such as these, the FBI recommends discreet deployment of a tactical intervention group—mentally disturbed people can become very anxious and react inappropriately, especially if they have a paranoid disorder—along with patience, a non-threatening and non-judgmental attitude, and avoidance of confrontation. Unlike the case of conventional negotiations, when dealing with disturbed individuals it is sometimes possible to give without expecting anything in return, if only to build or strengthen a rapport. The preferred method for defusing such crises is to use active listening and communication to reduce the intensity of emotions and create a bond of trust with the person in distress. During this time the individual will be less likely to assault any hostages. Non-violent, reassuring solutions must also be presented and an honourable way out must be allowed. As stated by Greenstone (1995), police intervention must be essentially focused on management of the immediate crisis, not problem-solving. The role of the negotiator is to offer hope first, not necessarily a solution. This is more “psychotiation²” than negotiation (St-Yves, Tanguay & St-Pierre, 2001: 4).

1. Crisis Intervention Models

In crisis situations the person in distress usually moves through three classic stages: (1) the acute stage (generally emotional); (2) problem-solving (more rational and focused on solving the prob-

2. Expression used by St-Yves, Tanguay & St-Pierre (2001) to mean that it is more a matter of psychological intervention aimed at defusing a crisis than a negotiation in the traditional sense.

lem); and (3) acceptance or resignation (including the ability to accept and face consequences). Most crisis intervention models follow this pattern and have been developed in accordance with these natural—indeed universal—stages of human crises, which are often set off by deep psychological distress.


The following models have been selected for their empirical utility—they have been developed by practitioners for the most part—and simplicity. These are essential qualities of any practical and effective model for handling crisis situations.

a) The Behavioural Change Stairway Model (BCSM)

The Behavioural Change Stairway Model (BCSM) was developed in the mid 1990s by the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit and is used for the most part in highly volatile crisis situations. It has the same objective as all contemporary models: to achieve voluntary and peaceful surrender.

The BCSM has five stages that must be completed by the negotiator: (i) active listening; (ii) empathy; (iii) rapport; (iv) influence; and (v) behavioural change. These five stages must be followed in sequence to resolve the crisis. The progression is sequential (with an ascending order) and cumulative (each stage must be completed before the next is attempted) (see Figure 2). The negotiator must first use active listening and empathy to successfully establish a rapport with the person in crisis, and this must be accomplished before using the influence and persuasion technique that will lead to the intervention's culmination of behavioural change and, ultimately, voluntary surrender.

The BCSM has recently been revised by Van Hasselt, Romano and Vecchi (2005) and renamed the Behavioural Influence Stairway Model (BISM). The only notable difference is the fact that active listening is now considered the essential basic skill that must be maintained throughout the intervention. It is also through active listening that each stage in the behavioural change process is completed. Nevertheless, as Kelln and McMurtry (2007: 35) state: “while an alliance between negotiator and subject is a necessary component in resolving a crisis situation, it is not sufficient.”

Figure 2

The Behavioural Change Stairway Model (Vecchi *et al.*, 2005: 542).

i. Active Listening

Most people in crisis need to be heard. Active listening is the first step in the BCSM. The core skills of active listening are mirroring, paraphrasing (restating content), emotional labelling, and summarizing (restating content and emotions). Pauses, minimal encouragers, open-ended questions, and “I” statements are supplemental skills. Using the core skills (mirroring, paraphrasing, emotional labelling and summarizing) is recommended until the negotiator has successfully struck a chord. The supplemental skills should then be used to enhance the effectiveness of the active listening (Vecchi, 2003). These are the same skills used in counselling to establish a rapport and therapeutic relationship with clients (Hersen & Van Hasselt, 1998, in Vecchi *et al.*, 2005).

ii. Empathy

Empathy is a natural by-product of active listening. It is the ability to understand others, to feel what they are feeling and identify with their situations. Active listening and empathy are used to build the rapport.

iii. Establishing a Rapport

Until this stage, the relationship between the negotiator and person in crisis has been one-sided: the person in crisis has been talking and expressing emotions, while the negotiator has been listening actively and showing empathy. These first two stages enable the building of trust and discovery of mutual affinities. Establishing a rapport involves a certain degree of reciprocity. Once the rapport has been established, the person in crisis is more inclined to listen (and agree to) what the negotiator says or offers (Vecchi *et al.*, 2005: 544). Now the negotiator can begin to build themes that will enable the person in crisis to save face, restore self-esteem, justifications and minimizations, which will serve as precursors to ending the crisis (Dalfonzo, 2002, in Vecchi *et al.*, 2005).

iv. Influence

At this stage a rapport has been established and the subject accepts the negotiator's suggestions as a prelude to behavioural change. Now the negotiator and the person in crisis work together to identify non-violent and realistic solutions (Vecchi *et al.*, 2005: 545).

v. Behavioural Change

Behavioural change can only occur if the previous four stages have been successfully completed. The two main obstacles at this stage are usually: (1) the negotiator has moved too rapidly through the stages, or (2) certain stages have been omitted. This observation has led to the development of the SINCRO model, which we will review below.

The FBI model shows that people skills, particularly active listening and empathy, function as the mortar for establishing the rapport (an alliance) that will then serve as the foundation to build—using know-how (persuasive strategies and techniques)—the behavioural change that will lead to voluntary and peaceful surrender.

b) The STEPS Model

The STEPS (Structured Tactical Engagement Process) model, developed by Kelln and McMurtry (2007), views the crisis situation

as a behavioural problem. The person in crisis must become motivated to exit the situation and commit to a peaceful surrender procedure.

STEPS is based on Prochaska and DiClemente's transtheoretical stages of change model (1983), which was developed to modify behaviours to achieve goals such as losing weight or quitting smoking. It has four stages, starting with the person in crisis becoming aware of the situation (Step 0) and ending with voluntary surrender (Step 3) (see Table 1). It is flexible and must not become an obstacle for negotiators. As with all models, skipping steps and focusing on the last stage may lead to complications.

Step 0: At this stage subjects are not yet aware that the situation is a siege. They do not understand its danger. They will often be reluctant, perhaps acting stubbornly and aggressively, to resolve the situation. Suggestions by negotiators will be seen as ridiculous, derided or greeted with hostility. For the moment they are simply not ready to resolve the situation peacefully. Any attempt at resolution will be non-productive, or even destructive.

In this first stage subjects may make unrealistic requests or simply demand that the police leave the premises.

Step 1: Subjects realize that in order to resolve the situation, cooperation with the police is necessary. They realize that the police will not leave until the situation has ended. They realize that they will have to change, but do not have the resources or confidence to do so. Negotiators may offer encouragement and reassurance, creating hope by saying that no crime has been committed or, if this is not the case, that it is not that bad.

Step 2: Subjects now realize that there is a problem and begin to consider or commit to a solution. They may explore various possibilities (such as surrendering with or without handcuffs, with or without charges, etc.), and will also attempt to save face. Negotiators must now be more active and more directive. Any major stumbling blocks or particular problems may bring the negotiation back to a previous stage. Is there a surrender plan acceptable to both parties?

Step 3: This is the last step. Subjects now agree to a peaceful surrender. Negotiators must remain directive and helpful and guide subjects out.

The STEPS model provides a good illustration of the dynamic process of police intervention in crisis situations; from becoming aware of the problem—or its severity—to hope. The subjects' hope for an exit is strong enough that they agree to commit to a process of change. The STEPS model shows, in practical terms, the psychological and contextual stages of the person in distress, as well as the interventions recommended for each stage. At the outset these interventions are not something the person in crisis wants, and they are sometimes rejected with hostility, but they will come to be a life preserver to be grabbed onto when the subjects are able to see and touch them.